This article presents a large-scale, systematic study of politically connected firms in China through compiling a database that includes all the publicly traded firms in China in 1993, 2002, and 2012 through coding the biographies of hundreds of thousands of board members. I find that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of firms that are connected with the national government in the last 20 years, which casts doubt on a popular argument that businesses in China have primarily relied on "local protectionism." I interpret this as a result of firms' need to connect with powerful and stable institutions. I test this by examining the impact of the fall of Chen Liangyu on firms in Shanghai.
Ping An Insurance (中国平安), a big financial services company registered in Shenzhen, became widely known after a New York Times article reported that one of its largest shareholders is Yang Zhiyun (杨志云), China's former Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝)'s mother. 1 An examination of Ping An's public records reveals that it is probably one of the most politically connected firms in China: two of its board members used to work in the national government, five in local governments, including a vice mayor of Shenzhen, and the firm's president is a delegate to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. Ping An Insurance is not alone. As unveiled in the recent anti-corruption campaign in China, many firms are connected to powerful politicians, such as China National Petroleum Corporation (中石油)'s connection to Zhou Yongkang (周永康) and Dalian Shide (大连实德)'s connection to Bo Xilai (薄熙来). The downfall of a politician in China is often preceded or followed by the fall of one or more companies.
However, despite the prevalence of politically connected firms in China, we have little comprehensive knowledge about them beyond anecdotes and case studies. This article presents a large-scale, systematic study of politically connected firms in China through compiling a database that includes all the publicly traded firms in China in 1993, 2002, and  2012 through coding the biographies of hundreds of thousands of board members. I distinguish connections with seven political organizations: the national government, local government, the national parliament, local parliament, the National Party Congress, local Party congress, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). A firm is defined as being connected if at least one of its board members is formerly or currently an employee or a member of these organizations.
I find that, first, political connections are ubiquitous among listed firms in China:
almost 90 per cent of firms are connected. Second, firms are overwhelmingly connected with the government rather than the parliament, which is a more common form of connection in democracies. Third, while more firms are connected with local governments than the national government, there has been a significant increase in the percentage of firms that are connected with the national government in the last 20 years. The proportion of firms connected with the national government has tripled from 1993 to 2012, whereas the proportion of firms connected with local governments has increased only by 30 per cent.
This last finding casts doubt on a popular argument that businesses in China have primarily relied on collusive relationships with local politicians. For example, Oi argued that "Growth will result as long as there are secure property rights for some organized unit and sufficient incentives for that unit to pursue growth. In the process local governments have taken on many characteristics of a business corporation, with officials acting as the equivalent of a board of directors" (italics by the author). 2 In the same vein, Wank contended, " [P] rivate business operated in networks of personal ties centered on the local government. Personal ties with state agents enhance access to profit opportunities located in the state's bureaucracy and protect subsequent wealth accumulations" (italics by the author).
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This article offers new data and methods to challenge this conventional wisdom. My interpretation of the trend is that local connections can make investors vulnerable by 2 Oi 1992, 100.
3 Wank 1999, 4. exposing them to political uncertainties. Especially in authoritarian regimes in which political processes are opaque, and political wind shifts quickly, business people can easily bet on the wrong side. Therefore, firms in a politically uncertain environment need to build robust connections to minimize political hazards. Connections with powerful and stable institutions, such as the national government, are less susceptible to political shocks.
There are two primary reasons why national connections are more robust than local connections. First, while local politicians must rotate across localities and, therefore, cannot stay in one place for a long time, central government officials are less frequently rotated. This article contributes to the political connection literature by disaggregating different types and levels of connections and examining the various functions they serve. In addition, the findings challenge the conventional wisdom based primarily on the case studies that postulated that Chinese firms have overwhelmingly relied on "local protectionism," 6 and
show that central connections are more important than previously believed. While local protections are still important, they expose firms to political risks under certain circumstances.
I also join the debate about whether the significance of "guanxi (关系)" has declined in China as a market economy is established. 7 My findings imply that the focus of future "guanxi" studies should shift from whether "guanxi" is important to what type of "guanxi" is important and why.
DATA
I construct a Chinese Listed Firms Database (CLFD) that includes the personnel and financial information of all listed firms in China in 1993 China in , 2002 China in , and 2012 . One advantage of focusing on listed firms is that financial market data are often incredibly detailed and comprehensive compared to firm-level surveys that can only ask a limited number of questions and are subject to perception bias. In addition, the longitudinal nature of financial market data makes it possible to examine trends over time, which is the main purpose of this study, while longterm panel firm-level surveys are non-existent. However, one disadvantage is that non-listed 6 Oi 1992; Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995; Wank 1999 . If a firm is defined to be connected when at least one of its board members is connected with at least one of those seven organizations, then almost 90 per cent of firms are connected.
Second, firms are overwhelmingly connected with the government rather than the parliament, which is a more common form of connection in democracies. 23 Third, while it is still the case that more firms are connected with local governments than the national government, which is consistent with the "local protectionism" argument, there has been a significant increase in the percentage of firms that are connected with the national government in the last 20 years.
Both the panel and the three cross sections show that the proportion of firms connected with the national government has tripled from 1993 to 2012, whereas the proportion of firms connected with local governments has increased only by 30 per cent. And the higher percentage of firms connected with the local government might be simply due to the fact that there is a higher supply of retired or resigned local officials than central officials given the larger pool of the former. As calculated by Ang, the number of local officials (province and 22 For my code book, please see "Code Book for Government Connections" in the web appendix.
23 Eggers and Hainmueller 2009; Jayachandran 2006. below) are four times that of central officials in most years between 1954 and 1998. 24 Adjusted for the availability, the demand for national officials has increased even more dramatically over the last 20 years. Figure 1 presents some of the key results.
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
In the analysis above, the political connection variable is coded as binary. An alternative measure is the degree of connectedness of a firm, e.g. the number of connections per firm. Table A13 in the web appendix shows the trend using the alternative measure, which is very similar to Figure 1 .
One might wonder whether the increase has been driven by an increase of stateowned enterprises (SOEs) in the sample. While it is true that the state often appoints SOE Insurance is coded as a highly connected firm with two board members connected with the national government, five connected with local governments, and one connected with the national parliament. Second, there are many ways to build a connection, such as friendship, marriage, and bribery. I only focus on a direct measure that is observable for all firms. 28 Nytimes.com 2012.
Characteristics of Connected Firms
What are the characteristics of politically connected firms? I compare connected and nonconnected firms on the following dimensions using the 2012 cross section: assets, profit, return on assets, tax, leverage, and state-owned share. Accounting data for Chinese listed companies were taken from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR).
29
ASSETS is defined as the natural log of total assets. PROFIT is defined as the natural log of total profit of a firm. Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of a company's net income prior to financing costs to total assets × 100. TAX is calculated as the ratio of tax and fees to total profit × 100. Leverage is a proxy for access to debt financing. LEVERAGE is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets × 100. State-owned share (SOE SHARE) is defined as the ratio of state-owned shares to total shares × 100.
I then conduct regression analysis using one of the aforementioned variables as the dependent variable and one of the connection variables as the independent variable. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression being performed is:
where ! is one of the variables measuring the characteristics of firm , including These relationships are obviously only correlational rather than causal. It might be that bigger and more profitable firms have more resources to hire connected politicians (or politicians prefer to take jobs in bigger firms), or political connections help firms grow larger and more profitable. The next section will provide an interpretation for the results.
WHY ARE NATIONAL CONNECTIONS ROBUST?
Connections between politicians and businesses are not a unique, contemporary Chinese a coal mine with production over 500,000 tons/year should be approved by Beijing rather than a local government, and similar bars are applied to a wide range of projects from gas and electric to highway and tobacco. 46 Meanwhile, after over 30 years' industrialization, the sheer size of the Chinese economy and the number of large companies have increased dramatically. China's aggregate GDP's world ranking has jumped from the 15th in 1978 to the second in 2013, and the number of firms on Fortune's 500, a list of the 500 largest companies in the world, has increased from three in 1995 to 95 in 2013. 47 As a consequence, big firms are no longer satisfied with only accessing local markets; they want to gain access to the national market.
For example, for Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), having a close relationship with the Shanghai municipal government would position the firm to insure that the Shanghai taxi fleet was almost entirely composed of SAIC Santanas. But it would do nothing to help the firm breakdown barriers to the Hubei market and sell more Santanas after it was saturated the Shanghai taxi market.
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The Chinese political system also motivates firms to build connections with the national government. Beijing still has the prerogative to appoint, rotate, and remove provincial-level officials. 49 The nomenklatura power gives the center both ex ante and ex post mechanisms to influence local politics.
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These stylized facts about the Chinese economy and polity cast doubt on conventional 46 Gov.cn 2004. 47 Fortune.com 2014.
48 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out and providing the example. 49 Yang 2006. 50 Burns 1994; Huang 1995; Sheng 2007; Kung and Chen 2011. models that focused on the local state's role in China's economic development, be it "local corporatism," 51 "local protectionism," 52 or "federalism: Chinese style." 53 As Yang pointed out, they have "gone too far." 54 We expect to see a broader coalition built by firms and a more active and powerful role played by the national state in China's economic transitions.
Stable Connections
National connections are also more stable than local connections for two reasons. First, as a control mechanism of the center, Chinese local officials are constantly rotated among A second reason why national connections are more stable than local connections is that local officials are more likely to be targeted during anti-corruption campaigns. Figure 3 shows the percentages of local and national officials that have been indicted for corruption from 1988 to 1998. 60 The probability of a local government official being caught for corruption is approximately 200 times that of a central government official. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is the need for autocrats to maintain elite unity at the top level, 61 or it is due to the center's blame-shifting strategy so the national government can 57 Ang 2010.
58 Huang 2002, 72-73. 59 Ibid. 60 The percentage is the ratio of the total number of officials indicted for corruption to the total number of officials ×100. The data for the number of officials at various levels indicted for corruption are from Wedeman (2012, 101) , and the data for the total number of Chinese officials are from Ang (2012, 693) . The data used to generate the figure are presented in Table A1 in the web appendix. 61 Geddes 1999; Svolik 2012. enjoy a high level of trust among the masses. is big enough to generate a political earthquake. 63 Second, for an approach to estimate the impact of an event on the stock market to work, the event must be exogenous and surprising.
There have been many corruption scandals that were endogenous to political connections, and the information of the dismissals has been leaked before the official announcements, such as most of the events during the recent anti-corruption campaign, which does not justify the use of such an approach.
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On Monday, September 25, 2006, the Chinese official media announced the dismissal 62 Li 2004. 63 Another significant event is the downfall of Bo Xilai. However, Bo's political career mixed central and local experiences, which makes the estimation of the impact less clean. For a comparison of Chen and Bo, please see Wang (2014) . 64 A recent example is the corruption scandal involving Zhou Yongkang, and the news had been circulated long before the actual investigation was announced.
and detention of Chen Liangyu because of his involvement in the Shanghai social security fund scandal. 65 Chen made his last public appearance as the Shanghai Party boss on the evening of September 23, and the purge was kept strictly confidential before September 25.
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The fall of Chen Liangyu involved decisions made by people at the very top. The available evidence shows that Chen Liangyu fell because he misallocated social security funds, and some observers believe that the fall of Chen was due to his resistance to central policies, 67 none of which was related to firms hiring former politicians.
One might argue that examining how national connections are immune to a local political shock is not strong evidence that national connections are more robust. As I discussed earlier, national connections are more robust not because firms connected with the national government are unsusceptible to political shocks (they are actually susceptible to national shocks). However, the key is that local political shocks happen far more often than local shocks. So from a long-term perspective, connecting with the national government is a much safer strategy for firms.
Procedure
I conduct an event study to estimate the impact of Chen's fall on firms registered in Shanghai.
Event studies use financial market data to measure the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm. The rationale of such a study is based on the fact that, "given rationality in the marketplace, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices. 
firms connected with only the national government, and (4) firms connected with both the national and local governments. There were firms that were connected with other political organizations as well, such as parliament or CCP Congress, but I will focus on government connections in the following analysis. Table 1 summarizes the frequencies of these four types.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
I follow the standard event study procedure to estimate the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return for the five-day period (event window) around the event date (days -2 to +2). 72 The event date for Chen's removal is straightforward: September 25, 2006, 69 For a review of event studies, please see MacKinlay (1997) . 70 Roberts 1990; Fisman 2001; Bernhard and Leblang 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2013. 71 Every board member was double-coded by a group of research assistants and me.
72 MacKinlay 1997. the day of the announcement and the first trading day after his last public appearance. 73 I estimate the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return during the event window [-2, 2] using the standard event study methodology. Normal return is the expected return without conditioning on the event taking place. Abnormal return (AR) is defined as the actual ex post return of security during the event window [-2, 2] minus the normal return of the firm during the event window [-2, 2] . I use the estimation window [-110, -10 ] to estimate the normal return based on the "market model":
where !" and !" are the period-t (in this case [-110, -10] ) returns on security i and the market portfolio, respectively, and ϵ !" is the zero mean disturbance term with variance of . ! ! α ! and ! are the parameters of the market model.
With the estimated parameters α ! and ! , the AR is:
where !" is the daily return of stock i during event window ([-2, 2]), and !" is the estimated normal return based on Equation (1) 
Results
The CAR has a mean of -1.13 per cent with a standard deviation of 4.76 per cent. Figure 4 shows a simple box-plot of the average CARs across different categories of firms. 74 Firms connected only with the local government had a significant CAR of -2.34 per cent, firms connected with both the national and local governments had a significant CAR of -2.23 per cent, unconnected firms had an insignificant CAR of -0.81 per cent, and firms connected with only the national government had an insignificant CAR of 1.98 per cent.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
These descriptive statistics imply that firms were the most vulnerable if they were connected with only the local government. Because Chen Liangyu spent his whole career in Shanghai, his removal caused a quasi-earthquake in Shanghai that affected firms with only local connections. Firms connected with both the national and local governments were also negatively affected: their supermajoritarian connections exposed them to risks at both levels.
In contrast, unconnected firms and firms connected with only the national government were largely unaffected.
The following specification is OLS estimated to test whether the differences between these categories are significant:
74 Data used to generate this figure are presented in Table A11 in the web appendix. 76 The full regression results are presented in Table A12 in the web appendix.
national government experienced a significant CAR of 4.57 per cent.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
As for the controls, I find that older firms lost less than new firms during the shock.
However, size and ownership of firms did not make a difference to their market values during the shock.
The results suggest that firms are much better off if they are unconnected or connected with only the national government in the face of a local political shock. However, unconnected firms, although they do not incur the costs, also do not benefit from political connections. Building connections with the national government is a safe, beneficial strategy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Social scientists have long been interested in how investors cope with uncertainties. 77 A popular argument is that investors in a weak rule-of-law regime rely on political connections to substitute for formal legal protection. 78 However, political connections can make investors vulnerable by exposing them to political uncertainties.
Relying on a large dataset of Chinese listed firms, I show that although local connections are still the most prevalent form of political connections, firms in China have increasingly built connections with the national government. The reasons are twofold. First, national connections are more powerful as the Chinese polity has been centralized in the latter half of the reform era, and the Chinese economy has become too big for local governments to control. Second, national connections are more stable because local officials 77 Dixit 1994; Henisz 2000 . 78 Oi 1992; Johnson et al. 2000; Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003; Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011. are constantly rotated and more likely to be targeted during anti-corruption campaigns.
Building connections with the national government therefore provides a more robust form of protection for businesses under a weak rule-of-law regime.
The findings shed light on our understanding of the role of the state in development and coalition-building in authoritarian regimes. The "developmental state" literature championed the benefits of the state being "embedded" in the economy. 79 However, as I
show, the embeddedness also exposes firms to political risks that are common in authoritarian regimes, and firms must strategize as to which institutions they want to be connected to. I have also disaggregated "the state" by level, which was often fused in prior studies of developmental states.
In addition, this paper also contributes to the theory of political coalitions. While the existing literature has been focused on the size of coalitions, 80 I show that members of a coalition are important. Firms do not necessarily consider along the lines of either "supermajoritarian" coalitions or minimal winning-coalitions; they must build coalitions with robust institutions that are powerful and stable. 
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Figure 3: Percentages of Local and National Officials Indicted for Corruption (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Local Officials National Officials Notes: The dependent variable is the five-day cumulative abnormal return. UNCONNECTED, BOTH NATIONAL & LOCAL, and NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ONLY are all dummy variables indicating their connectedness. AGE is a continuous variable measuring the age of the firm. ASSETS (log) is the natural log transformed total assets. SOE is an indicator measuring the ownership of the firm. The regression controls for industry fixed effects. The black dots are the OLS estimates, lines the 95% confidence intervals, and the small bars 90% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors.
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